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Abstract—The role-based access control (RBAC) is a natural 
and versatile model of the access control principle. In the real 
world, it is common that an organization provides a service to 
a user who owns a certain role that was issued by a different 
organization. However, such a trans-organizational RBAC is 
not common in a computer network because it is difficult to 
establish both the security that prohibits malicious 
impersonation of roles and the flexibility that allows small 
organizations/individual users to fully control their own roles. 
This study proposes a system that makes use of Bitcoin 
technology to realize a trans-organizational RBAC mechanism. 
Bitcoin, the first decentralized digital currency, is a payment 
network that has become a platform for innovative ideas. 
Bitcoin’s technology, including its protocol, cryptography, and 
open-source nature, has built a good reputation and has been 
applied in other applications, such as trusted timestamping. 
The proposed system uses Bitcoin technology as a versatile 
infrastructure to represent the trust and endorsement 
relationship that are essential in RBAC and to realize a 
challenge-response authentication protocol that verifies a 
user’s ownership of roles.  
Keywords-role-based access control; trans-organizational 
role; information security; Bitcoin; trusted-timestamping. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Roles and Role-Based Access Control 
Roles and titles are often used to distinguish the 
eligibility of people to access certain services. Such 
mechanism is modeled as the role-based access control 
(RBAC) [1] framework, which describes the access control 
relation among users and services. In RBAC, users are 
associated with roles, and roles are associated with services. 
This framework is compatible with the access control 
requirements of real-world organizations and is employed in 
the computer systems of many organizations/companies. 
However, it must be noted that RBAC is a versatile 
framework, and roles are often used in a trans-organizational 
manner. For example, students are often allowed to purchase 
computer software at an academic-discounted price. In this 
example, the “student” role that is issued by an organization 
(school) is used by another organization (computer shop) to 
determine if a guest is eligible to receive a certain service 
(discounted price). This kind of trans-organizational use of 
roles is common in face-to-face communication, but it is not 
obvious in computer networks. Even if one has a certain role 
(student role) that is issued by an organization (school), 
he/she has no systematic way of convincing a third-party 
organization (computer shop) that he/she really has that role.  
To realize a trans-organizational RBAC mechanism in a 
computer network, a mechanism that prevents malicious 
users from disguising their roles is necessary. This 
requirement is naturally accomplished in real-world services 
with the use of physical certificates, such as passports and 
ID-cards, which are expected to be difficult to forge or alter. 
This problem, however, is not obvious in a computer system. 
Digital certificates [2] can be utilized as an analogue of 
physical certificates, but the use of digital certificates is not 
favorable because it requires considerable and continuous 
elaborations to maintain secure public-key infrastructures. 
Another less sophisticated approach to the security problem 
is to let a service-providing organization (the computer shop 
in the above example) inquire a role-issuing organization 
(school) about the user-role assignment. This approach 
works fine in some cases [3], but a focal point of this 
approach is the necessity for the agreed beneficial 
relationship among organizations. Consequently, it is 
difficult for a new organization to join the partnership, 
severely restricting the trans-organizational utilization of 
roles. 
B. Bitcoin  
Bitcoin is a decentralized global currency cryptosystem 
that has increased in value and popularity since its inception 
by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [4]. As of March 2015, Bitcoin 
has a market capitalization of approximately 4 billion USD, 
market price per Bitcoin (BTC) of approximately 280 USD, 
and on average, 100,000 transactions daily [5]. The main 
purpose of Bitcoin is to enable a payment system and 
complete digital money that is secure and decentralized; that 
is, it is a peer-to-peer network powered by its users and with 
no central authority. To achieve this, transactions are 
publicly announced and the participants agree on a single 
history of these transactions. The transactions are grouped 
into blocks, given timestamps, and then published. The hash 
of each timestamp includes the previous timestamp to form a 
chain, making accepted blocks difficult to alter. Based on this 
security, Bitcoin features many favorable properties, 
including easy mobile payments, reliability, full control of 
one’s own money, high availability, fast international 
payments, zero or low fees, protected identity, and privacy 
[6].  
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C. Bitcoin as an Infrastructure 
The current study aims to develop a practical system that 
uses Bitcoin technology to realize the trans-organizational 
utilization of roles. We investigate a realization of a user-role 
assignment that is secure (users cannot disguise roles), user-
oriented (users can disclose their roles to any organization), 
and open (anyone can verify if a user has a certain role that is 
managed and issued by another organization). The key ideas 
are to define correspondence between the roles issued by 
organizations and the users and to employ a challenge-
response authentication protocol that will be used for 
verifying if a user really has an asserted role.  
Bitcoin’s protocol and cryptography make the proposed 
system suitable for the trans-organizational utilization and 
authentication of roles, and furthermore, allow flexible role 
management operations, such as the endorsement and 
management of roles, with relatively small realization cost.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces RBAC and the different models associated with it. 
Section III discusses the Bitcoin protocol to show the 
security it provides. Section IV presents the structure and 
procedures of the proposed framework. Section V presents 
the role management features of the system. Section VI 
provides the conclusion and future work.  
II. MODELS FOR THE ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
Among the many technical issues of the RBAC 
framework, this study mainly focuses on the realization of 
the user-role assignment in a trans-organizational scenario. 
Other issues of RBAC may be related to this study, but they 
are excluded from the scope of our discussion. To clarify the 
position of our study in the entire framework of RBAC, an 
abstract model of RBAC and its extension are discussed first.  
In the simplest model of the RBAC [1], the access 
structure is defined by three sets and two relations; the set 𝑈 
of users, the set 𝑅 of roles, the set 𝑆 of services, a user-role 
assignment UA ⊂ U × R , and  a  role-service assignment 
SA ⊂ R × S. A user 𝑢 is eligible to access a service 𝑠 if and 
only if there is a role 𝑟 such that (𝑢, 𝑟) ∈ UA and (𝑟, 𝑠) ∈
SA. In real-world services, roles can be used in a trans-
organizational manner. A role that was issued by a role-
providing entity can be referred by a foreign service-
providing entity to determine if a service should be given to 
an unknown guest. An interesting point here is that the role-
providing entity is not always concerned about the service-
providing entities. This suggests that the service-providing 
entity is not always allowed access to the user-role 
assignment, and thus, it needs to devise an alternative means 
to confirm if an unknown guest has a certain role or not. To 
deal with this kind of framework, we consider extending the 
basic model of RBAC by introducing a set of organizations. 
The trans-organizational RBAC is defined similarly to 
the usual RBAC, but a set O of organizations is defined in 
addition to the sets of users, roles, and services. Furthermore, 
the set 𝑅  of roles is partitioned into several subsets, with 
each subset of 𝑅  associated with an element in O, that is, 
𝑅 = 𝑅𝑜1 ∪ ⋯ ∪ 𝑅𝑜𝑛 , where 𝑜1, … , 𝑜𝑛 ∈ 𝑂 and 𝑅𝑜𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑜𝑗 = ∅ 
if 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. To make the relation among roles and organizations 
explicit, a role 𝑟 in 𝑅𝑜𝑖 is written as 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟. Similarly, the user-
role assignment UA is partitioned into disjoint subsets; UA =
UA𝑜1 ∪ ⋯ ∪ UA𝑜𝑛 , where UA𝑜𝑖  ⊂ U × 𝑅𝑜𝑖 . Obviously, 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟 ∈
𝑅𝑜𝑖 means that the role 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟 is managed by the organization 
𝑜𝑖 and the assignment of users to 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟 is controlled by that 
organization 𝑜𝑖. In the trans-organizational RBAC, a user 𝑢 
demands a service 𝑠 by asserting his/her role 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑜𝑖 that 
has been provided by a role-providing entity (organization) 
oi. The service-providing organization provides the service to 
user u if and only if (𝑢, 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟) ∈ UA𝑜𝑖  and (𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟, 𝑠) ∈ SA . 
Note that the test of (𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟, 𝑠) ∈ SA is easy for the service-
providing organization because the assignment SA is defined 
by the organization itself. On the other hand, the test of 
(𝑢, 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟) ∈  UA𝑜𝑖 ,  which  is  sometimes   called   an 
authentication, is not as obvious as the test of (𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟, 𝑠) ∈ SA 
because the assignment UA𝑜𝑖  is defined by a foreign service-
providing organization. 
The trans-organizational RBAC will be realistic only if 
the authentication of roles (𝑢, 𝑜𝑖 . 𝑟) ∈ UA𝑜𝑖 is accomplished. 
Physical certificates, such as passports and ID-cards, have 
been widely used for many years, but these certificates 
cannot be easily imported to the digitalized world over a 
computer network. Digital certificates have been studied for 
the replacement of physical certificates [2], but they are not 
widely accepted because of the cost issues for acquiring 
these certificates, keeping related keys secure, and 
maintaining a public-key infrastructure (PKI) [7][8] that 
should be always available. A less sophisticated but simpler 
approach is to arrange a mutual agreement between role-
providing organizations and service-providing organizations. 
However, such a framework will be semi-closed and only 
include organizations that share identical benefits. The 
authors have studied another approach for realizing secure 
authentication of roles by utilizing a special cryptography 
known as hierarchical ID-based encryption [9]. The scheme 
in [9] offers some advantages over other existing approaches, 
but it necessitates several users with the same role to have an 
identical secret key, which is not favorable from a security 
viewpoint. Other comparable systems include decentralized 
multi-authority systems for attribute-based encryption (MA-
ABE) and attribute-based signatures (MA-ABS) [10][11]. 
The MA-ABE in [10] is decentralized but requires a trusted 
setup of common reference parameters. The MA-ABS in 
[11] is also decentralized and does not necessitate a trusted 
setup, but it requires the setting of a public parameter for a 
prime order bilinear group and hash functions. Even though 
these schemes are decentralized, all users and organizations 
must agree on the parameters first. Confusion and 
implementation problems may arise if several communities 
use different parameters, and therefore, such systems must be 
initiated by somebody who has strong leadership, grand 
design, and sufficient financial power for implementation. 
Consequently, a scheme for a role authentication mechanism 
that is secure, practical, and easy to set up has yet to be 
established. 
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III. THE BITCOIN PROTOCOL 
Bitcoin is a collection of cryptographic protocols that 
allow secure online transactions between users [12][13]. 
These users own digital wallets that handle the creation and 
storage of private keys and the corresponding public Bitcoin 
addresses. A user can send a certain value or amount of BTC 
to another user by creating a transaction with the sender’s 
Bitcoin address/es as input/s and the receiver’s Bitcoin 
address/es as output/s. Transactions are validated by miners 
and then recorded in a global public ledger called the 
blockchain. The validation of transactions requires some 
amount of computation, and the miner who succeeds in 
validating these transactions is rewarded or compensated 
with Bitcoins and the transactions fees for his/her efforts. 
Validated transactions cannot be altered unless an attacker 
has computation power that overwhelms the total 
computation powers possessed by all other miners. 
A. Bitcoin Addresses 
A Bitcoin address is 160-bit hash of the public key of an 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The 
public key undergoes several cryptographic processes (SHA-
256, RIPEMD-160, and Base58 Encoding) to be converted 
into a valid Bitcoin address. A new ECDSA keypair is 
generated for each Bitcoin address. The private key is 
generated first, and then the public key is derived from the 
private key so that each private key corresponds to only one 
Bitcoin address. A user can create any number of Bitcoin 
addresses easily and for free, and thus, users usually use a 
digital wallet to store the private and public keypairs and the 
corresponding Bitcoin addresses (some wallet services create 
new Bitcoin addresses deterministically, i.e., using a seed). 
The users should backup and secure the private keys (or the 
wallet data file) because these private keys are needed to 
access the Bitcoins stored in the corresponding Bitcoin 
addresses. Each Bitcoin address contains a built-in 
checksum, and thus mistyped addresses can be detected. 
However, Bitcoins sent to a well-formed mistyped address 
with no owner are lost forever. Similarly, Bitcoins stored in 
Bitcoin addresses are lost if the owner loses control of the 
wallet file or the corresponding private keys.  
A Bitcoin address is in the form of random numbers and 
letters, e.g., 19zBWfkNicdLdTTweZe37XRj2aFoYmHEX6, 
and there are 2160 possible Bitcoin addresses that can be 
created. A Bitcoin address is considered to be “unique” as it 
is extremely unlikely for two users to independently generate 
the same Bitcoin address. 
B. Transactions, Blocks, and the Blockchain 
A transaction is a digitally signed data that is broadcasted 
to the Bitcoin network and then included in a block in the 
blockchain. A transaction contains the following information: 
transaction ID (used to identify the transaction in the 
blockchain); list of input addresses (addresses from which 
Bitcoins are transferred and should be outputs of previous 
transactions); list of output addresses (which contains the 
receiving addresses and the amounts of BTC being 
transferred). A sender of the transaction has to prove that 
he/she has control of the addresses in the list of input 
addresses by signing them (input addresses) with the 
corresponding private keys. Think of a Bitcoin address as a 
transparent vault where anyone can see or know the amount 
of Bitcoins inside, but only the one who has the key (private 
key) can spend or transfer the Bitcoins inside that vault.  
C. Blocks and the blockchain 
Transactions are grouped together in blocks and then 
recorded in the global ledger of the Bitcoin network. A block 
contains a record of transactions that have not been recorded 
in any previous block. Blocks are connected and linked 
together to form a blockchain, where a new block is added to 
the block that came before it. Every block contains the hash 
of the previous block, and thus, creating a chain that 
connects the first block (genesis block) to the current block.  
A block contains, among other things, a hash of the 
previous block, a hash of the merkle root of valid 
transactions to be included in this block, and a nonce (a 
unique solution to a difficult mathematical puzzle), as shown 
in Figure 1. The entire blockchain and every transaction 
included in the blocks can be downloaded or viewed online 
using a blockchain browser. 
D. Mining and Proof-of-Work 
Blocks are added to the blockchain through the process 
called mining. This process uses a proof-of-work system 
wherein miners all around the world use special software to 
solve mathematical problems. The mathematical problem is 
inherently difficult to solve and requires a “brute force” 
solution; that is, miners scan and test for a nonce that gives a 
correct solution to the mathematical problem. During 
mining, the mining hardware of a miner (CPUs, GPUs, 
FPGAs, and ASICS) runs a cryptographic hashing function 
composed of two rounds of SHA256 on the block header. 
The mining software increments the nonce as the random 
element in the block header until a valid hash is found. To 
control the difficulty of mining, a parameter called a 
difficulty target is agreed upon by miners. The difficulty 
target can be regarded as a threshold that is used in such a 
way that a miner is required to find a nonce that makes the 
hash of the block lower than the difficulty target 
(equivalently, the hash values should start with a certain 
number of zeroes). To compensate for increasing hardware 
speeds, the difficulty target is adjusted every 2016 blocks so 
that it takes on average 10 minutes to find a valid nonce. 
 
 
Figure 1.  A simplified representation of the Bitcoin blockchain. 
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The difficulty target is expressed as the difficulty on 
creating the current block compared to generating the first 
block and is determined as follows:  
 
                          difficulty = 
difficulty_1_target
current_target
                     (1) 
 
As of writing, the difficulty is 46,684,376,316.86 (the 
probability of each hash to be a valid solution is less than  
10-20) [5][14]. When a miner finds the correct nonce value 
that creates a hash value less than the target, it forwards the 
block to the rest of the nodes in the network. After validating 
the solution for the block, miners move on to solving for the 
next block.  
Sometimes, more than one miner may find a valid 
solution at approximately the same time, consequently 
forking the blockchain and dividing the nodes to work on 
different versions of the blockchain. This inconsistency is 
resolved when the solution for the next block is found and 
one of the branches becomes longer. In the Bitcoin protocol, 
miners always work on the longest chain (the chain with the 
most work put into it), and thus, in case of a fork, the shorter 
chain is orphaned.  
The miner who solves the block is awarded with newly 
“minted” Bitcoins (currently at 25 BTC) and the transaction 
fees of the transactions included in the solved block. This 
process of mining guides the issuance of Bitcoins and 
incentivizes miners to keep mining and approving 
transactions. 
The security of Bitcoin relies on this proof-of-work 
system, which inherently means that a block cannot be 
modified without redoing the work spent on it, including the 
work spent on blocks chained after it. Given this design, as 
long as majority of the overall CPU power participating in 
the Bitcoin network is controlled by honest miners, an 
attacker will be outpaced by the honest miners, making it 
almost impossible to modify a published block. 
E. Attacks on the Bitcoin Network 
Some strategies, both theoretically and in practice, have 
been devised to attack the security of the Bitcoin protocol 
and possibly put it in danger. Some attacks have been 
designed for dishonest or rogue miners, i.e., those who do 
not follow the Bitcoin protocol, to get rewards higher than 
their contribution to the network.  
These strategies include the pool hopping attack [15], the 
mining cartel attack [16], selfish mining [17], block 
withholding attack [18], and hardware attacks. These attacks 
are designed to infiltrate factors outside the blockchain, 
targeting the client side and stealing Bitcoins from them 
(pool and wallet infiltration). These attacks mainly aim to 
steal Bitcoins and/or gain higher rewards and not to modify 
transactions or the blockchain. Therefore, Bitcoin’s security 
remains intact and “backed by math”. For our purposes, the 
transactions between organizations and users will remain 
secure and unmodifiable because they are recorded in the 
blockchain. 
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME 
A. Overview 
The proposed system is a non-conventional 
authentication mechanism that is suitable for the trans-
organizational utilization of roles. The idea is to provide an 
irrefutable proof of the role of a user issued by an 
organization by verifying the connection of the user to the 
organization through the Bitcoin blockchain. Consider for 
example that A-university would like to manage a “student” 
role for its students. First, it would perform a Bitcoin 
transaction using its own public Bitcoin address/es as 
input/s and the corresponding students’ public Bitcoin 
address/es as output/s. Upon request for a service from an 
unknown user who asserts that he/she possesses the student 
role of A-university, a service-providing organization, for 
example a restaurant, will verify the Bitcoin transaction 
containing the Bitcoin addresses of A-university and the 
student, which connects the student role managed by A-
university to the output address in the transaction. After 
establishing the connection, the restaurant can verify 
(through a challenge-response protocol) if the unknown user 
has access to the output address in the transaction, which 
finally connects the student role from A-university to the 
unknown user. 
Note that the restaurant does not have to know anything 
about the role beforehand, and does not have to make any 
contract or inquiry to A-university that has assigned the role 
to the student because the details needed by the restaurant are 
published publicly and/or possessed by the user (details 
below). In the proposed system, there is no essential 
difference between users and role-issuing organizations 
because they both can be the sender and receiver in the 
Bitcoin transactions (but for simplicity and explanatory 
purposes, the role-issuing organizations will be differentiated 
from the users). 
B. Procedures 
Figure 2 shows the overall structure of the proposed 
system. In this model, we assume that the role-issuing 
organizations are Bitcoin users while the users and service-
providing organizations may or may not be Bitcoin users. 
Bitcoin user means that the entity owns a Bitcoin wallet and 
performs Bitcoin transactions. 
1) Pre-requisites 
An organization ( 𝑜1)  generates n Bitcoin addresses, 
where n is the number of roles that 𝑜1 wants to manage. The 
creation of these Bitcoin addresses (and the corresponding 
private keys) can be accomplished using several options, 
including Bitcoin wallets and online/offline Bitcoin address 
generators. After generating the n keypairs, 𝑜1  keeps the 
private keys secret and secure, and publishes the list of pairs 
of Bitcoin addresses and corresponding roles using chosen 
media (e.g., Website, database, etc.) to make it available to 
the public. We write 𝑜1. BPK𝑖 , 𝑜1. BA𝑖 , and 𝑜1: 𝑟𝑖  for the 
private key, Bitcoin address, and the role that is associated 
with the address 𝑜1. BA𝑖, respectively, where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛.  
32Copyright (c) IARIA, 2015.     ISBN:  978-1-61208-407-7
WEB 2015 : The Third International Conference on Building and Exploring Web Based Environments
 
Figure 2.  Overview of the proposed structure. 
 
 
The publication of these Bitcoin addresses will serve as 
proof that 𝑜1 owns and manages the addresses (it should be 
noted that 𝑜1  will not gain any benefit from publishing 
Bitcoin addresses that it does not own, and thus, will only 
publish Bitcoin addresses it owns).  
Similarly, a user (u) generates a pair of a private key 
u.BPK and a Bitcoin address u.BA. Alternatively, 𝑜1  can 
generate the (u.BPK, u.BA) keypair and send it to u through 
a secure communication channel. Note however, that it is 
recommended by the Bitcoin community that only the one 
who created the keypair should be in possession of the 
keypair because the private key is used for accessing the 
Bitcoins stored in the corresponding address. 
2) Creating the role-issuer and user connection  
The organization 𝑜1 creates a simple Bitcoin transaction 
using 𝑜1. BA𝑖 as input address and u.BA as output address. In 
this transaction, 𝑜1 sends an arbitrary amount of Bitcoins to 
u; currently the minimum amount that can be used for a 
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transaction to be considered valid is 0.00010001 BTC = 
0.03 USD (1 satoshi = 0.00000001 BTC plus 0.0001 BTC 
required transaction fee). Optionally, 𝑜1 can include a higher 
transaction fee or miners’ fee if it wants its transaction to be 
prioritized in the current round of solving for the block (but 
for our purposes, if the time of confirmation is not vital, the 
minimum transaction fee is sufficient). After confirming the 
details of the transaction, 𝑜1  sends the transaction to the 
Bitcoin network awaiting for confirmations from miners that 
it is permanently included in a block in the blockchain. Once 
included in the blockchain, certain details will be publicly 
available, including 𝑜1. BA𝑖 , u.BA, the amount of BTC 
transferred, transaction ID, block number, received time, and 
the time it was included in the block. 
3) Verifying a user-role assignment 
Assume that user u visits a service-providing 
organization 𝑜2 and asserts that he/she has the role of  𝑜1: 𝑟𝑖  
that was issued by 𝑜1.  
The organization 𝑜2  inquires u for the Bitcoin address, 
say u.BA, that was granted the asserted role of  𝑜1: 𝑟𝑖  from 
𝑜1 . Then 𝑜2  will (i) determine the Bitcoin address 𝑜1. BA𝑖 
that is associated with the role  𝑜1: 𝑟𝑖 , (ii) confirm the 
existence of the transaction from 𝑜1. BA𝑖  to u.BA, and (iii) 
verify if u is the genuine owner of u.BA. The Bitcoin address 
𝑜1. BA𝑖  can be found through the medium where 𝑜1 
published the Bitcoin addresses it owns. The confirmation of 
the transaction can be done by using a blockchain browser or 
a program similar to that. Steps (i) and (ii) assure 𝑜2 that the 
role  𝑜1: 𝑟𝑖  and other related information associated with 
𝑜1. BA𝑖  are assigned by 𝑜1  to the owner of u.BA. The 
ownership of u.BA is verified by a challenge-response 
protocol where ECDSA keys that are associated with the 
Bitcoin address u.BA are utilized. 
4) Challenge-Response Protocol 
The organization 𝑜2  chooses an arbitrary data m and 
requests u to sign it, together with u.BA, using the private 
key u.BPK. The signature is defined by S = Sign(u.BPK, 
u.BA, m), and thus a correct S will only be created if u has 
𝑢.BPK. User u then sends the signature back to 𝑜2 and 𝑜2 
will verify using the function ResponseVerify(𝑢.BA, m, S). 
Examples of signing/verifying a message to prove 
ownership of a Bitcoin address are shown in Figure 3.  
Remark that 𝑜2 can confirm if u has access to the role 
𝑜1: 𝑟𝑖  without querying 𝑜1 , and that u has little chance to 
disguise his/her role.  
V. ROLE MANAGEMENT 
In the proposed framework, the relation between users 
and roles is represented by the users’ possession of the 
private keys that prove they own the corresponding Bitcoin 
addresses. This approach involves a possible security risk; 
the leakage and loss of keys.  
A. Personalization of roles 
If a user leaks his/her private key, then the people who 
happen to know the key can also prove ownership of the 
corresponding Bitcoin address (which in turn can be used to  
  
 
Figure 3.  The signing (top) and verifying (bottom) of a message features 
of a Bitcoin wallet. 
 
prove that a role associated with the address was assigned to 
them). Note that the intended user can still prove ownership 
of the Bitcoin address even after leakage, although such an 
inappropriate usage of keys can obstruct fair and reliable 
access control. To deter such irresponsible behavior of users, 
the proposed system offers three possible measures: 
1. Given that the proposed system uses Bitcoin technology, 
it inherently has a “traitor tracing” capability because 
the Bitcoin addresses are unique (thus, they can be 
possibly mapped to users) and the transactions are 
published publicly. Thus, if a user receives a leaked key 
and maliciously uses the role associated to the 
corresponding Bitcoin address, a consequent 
investigation can possibly lead to the original user 
associated with the Bitcoin address.  
2. Role-issuing organizations can “personalize” roles by 
including some unique identifiers (which can be 
encrypted as well) to the data it will publish publicly. 
For example, A-university can publish 
“19zBWfkNicdLdTTweZe37XRj2aFoYmHEX6 issues 
a ‘student’ role to student #123 with 6 months validity.” 
3. Role-issuing organizations can “personalize” roles by 
making use of a public note that is included in the 
Bitcoin transaction. It should be noted that this public 
note is a relatively new feature offered by an online 
wallet (blockchain.info) [19] and is not part of the 
Bitcoin protocol.  
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With these measures, a student will be more conscious of 
leaking/losing his/her key to another person because he/she 
will have the risk of being identified and subsequently 
punished for irresponsible behavior. The theft/loss of keys 
remains a risk, but such risk also exists for ID-cards used in 
the real world.  
B. Role Re-issuance 
If the private keys are lost or forgotten, or if access to the 
digital wallet is lost or forgotten, then control over the 
corresponding Bitcoin addresses is also lost. The ownership 
of the Bitcoin addresses cannot be verified or proven without 
the corresponding private keys.  
In this case, the role-issuing organizations can easily re-
issue the roles by creating another Bitcoin transaction to the 
new Bitcoin address of the compromised user. The overhead 
of role re-issuance is relatively low for both the role-issuing 
organizations and the user.  
Moreover, to make sure that the compromised Bitcoin 
addresses will not be used maliciously, a role-issuing 
organization can create a revocation list containing these 
addresses in the media where it publishes the Bitcoin 
addresses it owns.  
C. Additional Security Measures 
Wallets are the most common target of attacks, but of 
course, security measures have been implemented and are 
recommended to minimize such cases. In the proposed 
system, the purpose of the Bitcoin transaction is to connect 
the user to an organization and to a role. If the user is a 
Bitcoin user, he/she is recommended to use other wallets or 
other addresses to store Bitcoins. Ultimately, the user only 
needs to store the private key safely, and even keep it offline. 
The challenge-response protocol can be performed offline. 
Moreover, an attacker with no prior knowledge of the 
proposed system and the role associated with the address will 
have no motives or incentives to steal the private key (even if 
an attacker can steal the private keys, the addresses will not 
contain large amounts of Bitcoins to steal). 
D. Endorsement  
The Bitcoin network provides a natural connection 
between Bitcoin addresses published in the blockchain. This 
function can be used to realize some personal activities that 
are not considered in the conventional RBAC approach. One 
possible example is the endorsement of another person. In 
the real world, an endorsement among individuals sometimes 
plays an important role. Semi-closed organizations, such as 
academic societies and golf clubs, have the tradition or 
policy that a newcomer must be endorsed or referred by a 
current member. This mechanism can be realized by 
extending the proposed system.  
Based on the system shown in Figure 2, consider for 
example that Alice (u) is an authorized member of XYZ golf 
club ( 𝑜1 ). This relationship is realized by the Bitcoin 
transaction from 𝑜1. BA  to u.BA. If Alice would like to 
endorse Bob (𝑢2 ) to 𝑜1 , then  she can similarly  create a 
Bitcoin transaction from u.BA to 𝑢2. BA ,  linking  their 
addresses. Then, Bob can go to 𝑜1 and declare 𝑢2. BA. The 
club can look up the blockchain and check that 𝑢2. BA was 
endorsed by u.BA, which was originally endorsed by the 
club, as represented by 𝑜1. BA . Once the connection is 
established, 𝑜1  can verify if 𝑢2  is the owner of 𝑢2. BA  by 
using the challenge-response protocol. By querying the 
blockchain and through the challenge-response 
authentication, the club does not have to inquire Alice for the 
verification of the endorsement. 
E. Trusted Timestamping as Proof of Validity or Expiration 
Dates 
Trusted timestamping is the process of securely creating 
a proof, i.e., timestamp, of the creation or modification time 
of a document. It is used for proving that certain information 
or document existed at some point in time and has not been 
tampered or modified since. 
Traditional timestamping processes follow the RFC 3161 
standard, wherein the timestamp is issued by a trusted third 
party acting as a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) [20].  
The Bitcoin network features a timestamp server used in 
the blockchain to link the blocks together in a chronological 
manner. This timestamp server has been used, outside the 
main purpose of Bitcoin, as a trusted timestamping 
mechanism for digital documents given that it is secure 
(extremely difficult to attack and modify), robust (DoS 
resistant), and a trustworthy source of time (the time a 
transaction is included in the blockchain) [21][22]. Put 
simply, a hash of the data that a user wants to timestamp is 
converted into a Bitcoin address. The timestamping service 
(or the user his/herself) then creates a Bitcoin transaction and 
makes a small payment to the converted Bitcoin address. 
This transaction is then stored in the public blockchain. 
Anyone who wants to verify the point in time a data (the 
hash of it) existed can be connected to the time the 
transaction that includes the corresponding converted Bitcoin 
address was included in the blockchain.  
This timestamping scheme is innovative and provides 
additional features as compared to the traditional trusted 
timestamps issued by TSAs, which are prone to data 
corruption and tampering. This timestamping scheme is 
decentralized and is not controlled by a single authority; it 
can easily be accessed over the Internet and is always 
available; it is anonymous (one’s identity, the data being 
given a timestamp, or even the fact that one wants something 
to be given a timestamp are kept secret); it is relatively low 
cost; the timestamp is accurate; and it is secure.  
The timestamp server of Bitcoin provides a natural 
solution to the inclusion of expiration dates or validity of the 
roles in the proposed system. The role-issuing organization 
includes the expiration dates or validity of the roles it 
manages in the information it publishes publicly. In this way, 
the service-providing organization can verify the validity of a 
role simply by investigating the timestamp of the block 
where the transaction was included in the blockchain and 
comparing it with the details published by the role-issuing 
organization. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The Bitcoin protocol was utilized as an infrastructure to 
realize a trans-organizational RBAC and represent the trans-
organizational usage of roles. The proposed system provides 
a secure mechanism for verifying the user-role assignments 
of organizations. Compared to other similar approaches, the 
proposed scheme provides more flexibility and autonomy 
while maintaining security. This mechanism allows the 
realization of many collaborative right managements that are 
common in physical communication but are difficult to 
implement over computer networks. Finally, the 
timestamping mechanism provided in the Bitcoin protocol 
provides a natural solution to the inclusion of expiration 
dates or validities in the created roles. Future research will 
focus on the realization and quantitative analysis of a more 
comprehensive hierarchical, multi-authority, and attribute-
based system, which can offer additional role management 
features, such as role transfer and access policies in terms of 
Boolean formulas, and on the development of a prototype for 
easier use and interoperability. 
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